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Abstract Many industrial firms motivate structural changes by
an increased focus on core activities and reduced ownership of
non-core activities. However, classifying maintenance activities
as either core or non-core can be difficult, since maintenance is a
support function strongly linked to the production core within a
manufacturing firm. Based on amultiple case study that included
four buying firms and four suppliers within the process industry,
this paper investigates how the relative capabilities of the firms
affect the governance decision aboutmaintenance outsourcing.A
conceptual framework built on a distinction between core-close
and core-distant maintenance and between different maintenance
capabilities is presented. The subsequent empirical analysis illus-
trates how the developed framework can be used for both ana-
lyzing and guiding firms’ decisions about outsourcing and gov-
ernance regarding maintenance.
Keywords Maintenance . Governance . Outsourcing . Firm
capabilities . Process industry
1 Introduction
Fierce competition in the global economy induces firms to
strategically identify and decide on which activities should
be performed internally and which would be more appropriate
to outsource (Sanchís-Pedregosa et al. 2014). The rapid devel-
opment of information and communication technologies has
alsomade outsourcing accelerate and encompass almost every
organizational activity (Aron and Singh 2005 and McIvor
2009), including areas such as service maintenance
(Barthèlemy and Quèlin 2006; McIvor 2005; Quinn 2000).
The effects that firms experience from outsourcing are, how-
ever, ambiguous (Bengtsson et al. 2009). Outsourcing has, on
the one hand, been associated with negative consequences
such as losing some of the capabilities that are outsourced
(Bettis et al. 1992). On the other hand, the outsourcing firm
is not limited to its own capabilities; it can take advantage of a
stream of external ideas and capabilities it could not possibly
generate itself (Quinn 2000). The decision to outsource there-
fore must consider the question of governance (Williamson
1999 and McIvor 2008).
Governing maintenance outsourcing relies on the interde-
pendencies between maintenance and core production
(Murthy et al. 2002). One problem here is that industry repre-
sentatives often do not regard maintenance as a contributor to
the core capability of a firm (Gupta et al. 2009); maintenance
is inversely regarded as safe to outsource in the belief that
outsourcing will not have an adverse impact on the firm’s
future capabilities and performance (Maley et al. 2015).
However, some researchers do indeed suggest that mainte-
nance is close to the core operation of the firm (eg (Levery
1998). In this paper, we use a distinction motivated by Arnold
(2000) and differentiate between core-close maintenance and
core-distant maintenance. The distinction is firm specific and
must be decided with care by management of the firm. In
process industries (such as the steel industry), the capacity
and the accuracy of the equipment is critical, and effective
maintenance is crucial for competitiveness as well. Process
industry plants are complex systems where many activities
are interlinked, something that makes the decision about what
is core and what is non-core difficult. Therefore, the process
industry is a fruitful context for studying outsourcing deci-
sions related to maintenance. To the best of our knowledge
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there is a lack of models for how to govern outsourced ser-
vices that support value-adding processes such as mainte-
nance. In addition to governance, the dearth of models in-
cludes analysis of relative capabilities. The outsourcing deci-
sion depends on the supplier’s capability to deliver the
outsourced services in a superior manner compared to the
outsourcing firm (McIvor 2008).
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to
investigate how firms’ relative capabilities affect the gover-
nance decision on maintenance outsourcing. Based on a mul-
tiple case study that includes four buying firms and four sup-
pliers within the process industry, this paper investigates how
the relative capability of the firms affects the governance de-
cision on maintenance outsourcing. More specifically, the pa-
per presents a conceptual framework that is defined by two
dimensions: (1) relative technical capability and (2) relative
organizational capability (eg, process maturity). The study
illustrates how the capability position of the supplier affects
the buying firm’s governance decision. In this paper, we con-
ceptualize the outsourcing package, representing capability
position in terms of technical and organizational capability,
maintenance distinctions, and governance typology. From
this, two research questions have been derived:
& RQ1 – In what way does a distinction between core-close
and core-distant maintenance affect the outsourcing
decision?
& RQ2 – How does supplier capability affect the gover-
nance of the outsourced maintenance activities?
2 Theoretical frameworks
In this paper, we conceptualize governance of maintenance
outsourcing by combining the supply chain management ma-
turity and the supply chain process maturity frameworks
(SCMM/SCPM) with a typology of global value chain gover-
nance. The SCMM/SCPM is an evolutionary framework that
provides a processual dimension and a way of mapping
changes in the supply chain over time (Varoutsa and
Scapens 2015). The governance typology provides not only
an understanding of different governance alternatives but also
how they are connected to a firm’s governance needs and,
together with SCMM/SCPM, to the relative capability posi-
tion of a supplier.
2.1 Core-close/core-distant maintenance
Industrial maintenance is one of the top five functions that are
most affected by outsourcing (Quèlin and Duhamel 2003).
Companies claim that maintenance is inimitable, because it
involves firm capabilities that cannot be easily implemented
or copied by their competitors (Maley et al. 2015), and there-
fore contributes to a firm’s competitive advantage.
Maintenance effectiveness directly impacts plant reliability,
uptime availability, and production efficiency, and therefore
affects cost-related and supply reliability aspects of competi-
tive advantage rather directly. Maintenance is often close to
the core operation of a manufacturing firm. A decision to
outsource maintenance is difficult because it might have a
strong effect on the firm’s production efficiency and encom-
passes not only professional skills but also process knowledge
and understanding of the interrelationship among processes in
the production plant (Levery 1998). At the same time, the
urgency and criticality of different maintenance activities vary
due to how they relate to the core of the production.
Inspired by Arnold (2000) distinctions between core-close
and core-distinct activities, this paper divides maintenance
services into either core-close or core-distant. The distinction
between them are built upon on two attributes; (1) Strategic
importance, where core-close is defined by the maintenance
activities that are directly targeted at and facilitated by the
firm’s core processes, ie the processes that have a strong effect
on the firm’s production efficiency, and therefore contributes
to competitive advantage (McIvor 2008). Core-distant main-
tenance is defined as maintenance activities that target pro-
cesses that are necessary and supportive, but less important
for maintaining the core process efficiency. (2) Degree of
specificity: according to Williamson (1991) and Arnold
(2000) specificity refers to asset specificity as well as human
capital specificity in terms of a high degree of knowledge,
skills, and experience. Core-close maintenance mainly relates
to high human capital specificity. However, core-close main-
tenance activities also involves a high degree of knowledge of
and experience with workflows and processes of core activi-
ties within the firm or the other party (Levery 1998), which is
defined as procedural asset specificity by Zaheer and
Venkatraman (1995). Core-distant maintenance concerns
medium or low asset specificity and refers to those
skills or expertice that are not key to the success for
the outcome of the firm’s or the other party’s core ac-
tivities (Cox 1996; Arnold 2000).
To decide whether a form of maintenance is core-close or
core-distant is tricky, but the decision is crucial for the strate-
gic approach and for the supplier selection process (McIvor
2008). When comparing two maintenance processes to classi-
fy if they are core-close or core-distant, one of them contrib-
utes less than the other. A truck is less strategically important
than vibration analysis, because in term of efficiency, quality,
and costs, it contributes less to the firm’s core business. A fan
could be extremely strategically important for production ef-
ficiency, while the same fan in another location in the produc-
tion plant can have no strategic value at all. This implies that
core-close and core-distant maintenance could have quite dif-
ferent effects on production efficiency (Ghayebloo and
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Shahanaghi 2010), and therefore must be maintained differ-
ently from both strategic and practical approaches. McIvor
(2000) states that defining core activities of the business is
the first step in the outsourcing decision. Determining the
contribution of a process to a firm’s competitive advantage
is central for the classification of core-close or core-distant
maintenance, and based on that classification central for the
outsourcing decision (McIvor 2000, 2008). The kind of main-
tenance as well as the relative capability position of the main-
tenance suppliers together constitutes sources of sustained
competitive advantage for the firm; this underlines the need
for firms to implement a value-creating relationship strategy
for business-critical maintenance processes. This strategy in-
volves the ability to select the right supplier and to build trust-
based relationships (Ireland et al. 2002).
2.2 Outsourcing
There are several definitions of the term outsourcing (see
overview in Gilley and Rasheed 2000). In the most far-
reaching understanding, outsourcing equals Boutside resource
using^ (Büner and Tuschke 1997 and Quinn and Hilmer
1994), which encompasses purchasing all kinds of activities,
including those that have never been done internally. The term
outside means creating value not within the company and a
strategic focus on external resources (Arnold 2000). A
narrower common understanding is that outsourcing describes
the process of having an activity that was formerly done inside
the organization performed by an external supplier (McIvor
2008 and Bengtsson 2008). Outsourcing has evolved into a
more strategic process; collaboration, cooperation, and co-
development are required to gain success (Ishizaka and
Blakiston 2012). Outsourcing demands a close and long-
term relationship to sustain a competitive advantage
(McHugh et al. 2003) and should not be used as a synonym
for contracting out. Contracting means work completed by an
external supplier on a single job basis (Hätönen and Eriksson
2009), whereas outsourcing involves reliance on the external
skills and capabilities of an external supplier (Kakabadse and
Kakabadse 2000 and Varadarajan 2009). Madhok (2002) rec-
ognized that firms need to consider their own capability attri-
butes and their competences prior to outsourcing. But how
they should consider them is less documented in the literature.
There are many articles about outsourcing (eg, Prahalad
and Hamel 1990; Quinn and Hilmer 1994; Cox 1996;
McIvor 2000, 2008), most of them without any guiding meth-
odology. The Sourcing Strategy framework byMcIvor (2008)
is an exception and a commonly used framework in operations
management. It is built up by assessing activities in two di-
mensions: relative capability and the contribution to compet-
itive advantage. According to McIvor (2008), a key strategic
issue for competitiveness is understanding why one firm dif-
fers in performance from another. Building on the resource-
based view of Barney (1991), he claims that competitive ad-
vantage is sustained when (a) competitors are unable to dupli-
cate the benefits of this strategy and (b) it continues to exist
after efforts to duplicate that advantage have failed.
Accordingly, the decision of whether a process should be
outsourced or not must be based on an evaluation of the firm’s
own capability relative to competitors and suppliers. McIvor
(2008) therefore argues that the analysis concerns identifying
the differences between the organization and potential exter-
nal process suppliers. One key issue here is the capability of
the suppliers that provide core services—whether they can
excel in vital processes compared with the organization itself
or its competitors (Aron and Singh 2005 and Ishizaka and
Blakiston 2012). However, it is not always easy to identify
which services are core or non-core (Cox 1996). As the sec-
ond dimension,McIvor (2008) contends that it is central to the
outsourcing process to determine the contribution to compet-
itive advantage of an activity.
2.3 Governance typology
Outsourcing creates an interfirm relationship between firm
and supplier (Barthèlemy and Quèlin 2006); that is,
outsourcing implies a change in how activities are governed.
Governance issues concerning interfirm relationships are re-
ceiving more and more attention in the literature. The use of
contracts and governance mechanisms is essential for
obtaining rewards from outsourcing (Lonsdale 1999; Datta
and Roy 2013; Ishizaka and Blakiston 2012). Vitasek and
Manrodt (2012) state that outsourcing requires a governance
structure with insights rather than oversight, involving ele-
ments of relationship management. The literature addresses
different kinds of governance structures and types for a firm’s
supply chain (eg, Gereffi et al. 2005 and Wathne and Heide
2004), relying on the new institutional economics literature, a
branch predominantly concerned with governance and where
transaction costs are located (Williamson 1998).
Maintenance must be seen as a supply chain of its own.
That’s because production plant maintenance is not directly
involved in the supply chain of firms’ core production but rather
supports the core supply chain, in other words the production
line, with corrective and preventive maintenance services.
Governance structures and mechanisms must allow for flexible
adaptation to changing circumstances (Williamson 1991) and
uncertainty in the downstream relationships (Wathne and Heide
2004). Following Dekker (2008) and Ireland et al. (2002), firms
can deal with control problems in interfirm relationships by
selecting an appropriate partner. Furthermore, the partner selec-
tion phase influences both collaboration and the use of gover-
nance arrangements (Dekker 2004).
Basic governance alternatives can be based theoretically on
Williamson’s institutional economics. He identified three ma-
jor governance structures for economic transactions
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(Williamson 1985): Markets—steer transactions by the price
mechanism,Hierarchies—based on centralization and direct-
ly linked with insourcing, and Hybrids—all structures in be-
tween the two others (Williamson 1999). Most other theoret-
ical models or frameworks in the literature also have this def-
inition of governance (eg, Arnold 2000 and McIvor 2008),
although with minor differences between them. Gereffi et al.
(2005) construct an analytical typology of global value chain
governance based on four determinants: (1) the complexity of
information and knowledge transfer required, (2) the extent to
which this information and knowledge can be codified and
transmitted efficiently, (3) the capabilities of actual and poten-
tial suppliers in relation to the requirements of the transaction,
and (4) the degree of explicit coordination and power asym-
metry. Their framework consists of five analytical governance
types with markets and hierarchies as the extremes; each gov-
ernance type provides a different trade-off between the bene-
fits and risks of outsourcing. The five governance types are:
1. BMarket^, a typical spot-market with market linkages not
completely transitory
2. BModular^, suppliers who make products to customer’s
specifications
3. BRelational^, networks with complex interactions be-
tween customer and suppliers, high mutual dependence
and a high level of asset specificity
4. BCaptive^, small suppliers who are transactionally depen-
dent on much larger customers, and
5. BHierarchy ,^ a governance form characterized by vertical
integration and managerial control.
Gereffi et al. (2005) argue that a theory of value chain
governance should allow for more than just generating differ-
ent forms of interfirm coordination. It must also anticipate
change in value chains, because governance structures evolve
over time as the value chain does. This implies that value
chains, governance typology, and structures undergo a matu-
rity process.
2.4 Supply chain process management maturity –
the influence on capability and governance
Some maturity models in the literature aim to evaluate the
present situation of a firm’s ability to be competitive, set goals,
allocate resources and collaborate with partners (Lahti et al.
2009). However, we are using the Supply Chain Management
Maturity (SCMM) model developed by Lockamy and
McCormack (2004), which was designed to measure supply
chain process management skills. Arguing that the Lockamy
and McCormack (2004) model relies on subjective metrics to
rank the maturity levels of firms, Oliveira et al. (2011) devel-
oped a new model of SCPM called Supply Chain Process
Management Maturity Model 3 (SCPM3), enabling an
understanding of the precedence of the dynamics of supply
chain process management skills as well as an identification of
the key turning points that distinguish the maturity levels
(Souza et al. 2015).
The governance will change as the supply chain moves
from low maturity and a traditional buyer–supplier relation-
ship towards a mature inter-organizational relationship and
mutual dependency, characterized as a shift from an internally
oriented approach to an externally oriented approach by
Lockamy and McCormack (2004). The following is a short
description of each SCM maturity level according to Oliveira
et al. (2011) and Lockamy and McCormack (2004), along
with each one’s connection to governance (Gereffi et al.
2005 and Varoutsa and Scapens 2015):
& Foundation (Ad hoc) – The supply chain and practices are
unstructured and ill-defined. This level comprises tradi-
tional arm’s-length market-based relationships character-
ized by a lack of close interaction and collaboration be-
tween suppliers and buyers (Varoutsa and Scapens 2015).
The marketplace consists of many potential suppliers, and
the main factors in the choice of supplier are the market
price and market governance (Gereffi et al. 2005).
& Structure (Defined) – Firms at this level seek to optimize
their use of resources through the integration of processes.
Production planning and distribution management are im-
plemented, and the primary objective of companies at this
level is the identification of critical partners and the for-
malization of contracts. There is no need for a sophisticat-
ed control instrument (Varoutsa and Scapens 2015), so a
market governance typology is still to be expected.
& Vision (Linked) – At this stage, companies review their
functional structure and logistics processes. Cooperation
among intra-company functions, vendors, and customers
is in place. Efforts to identify suppliers who are encour-
aged to invest in the relationship and commit themselves
to the supply chain (Varoutsa and Scapens 2015) are in
place. Firms exchange essential information and engage
some suppliers in longer contracts, and modular gover-
nance typology is needed rather than market governance
(Gereffi et al. 2005). This stage is the beginning of a more
collaborative relationship and can be considered the
Bbreakthrough^ phase, according to Lockamy and
McCormack (2004).
& Integration (Integrated) – At this stage of maturity the
stakeholders increasingly realize the importance of rela-
tionships. The company, as well as its vendors and sup-
pliers, takes cooperation to the process level, and by work-
ing more closely there is a need for more information
sharing (Caglio and Ditillo 2012). The objective of the
companies at this level is to build a supply chain based
on collaborative behavior, and the suppliers are involved
in the early stages of customer-specific product design,
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especially in modular products (Stevensson and Spring
2009). Partners are integrated through the sharing of risk
and rewards and long-term shared commitment and goals.
A modular governance typology is to be expected (Gereffi
et al. 2005).
& Dynamic (Extended) – This stage is characterized by the
systematic integration of the supply chain to allow for
dynamic behavior based on the continuous improvement
of processes. Collaboration with suppliers is established,
and the focus is on partnership based on mutual interests,
goals, and respect (Varoutsa and Scapens 2015). The focus
is on the relationship with, rather than the performance of,
the supplier (Johnsen et al. 2008), and advanced manage-
ment practices will be in place (Varoutsa and Scapens
2015) such as cross-organizational teams (Lockamy and
McCormack 2004). Sharing of strategic information is
necessary, especially for the governance of the relation-
ship (Varoutsa and Scapens 2015). The expected gover-
nance typology is a relational one (Gereffi et al. 2005).
When building trust-based interfirm relationships, such as
when moving from a traditional arm’s-length relationship to a
more mature supply chain including partnership with sup-
pliers, the firm needs to reconstruct its supply chain practices.
The studies by Caglio and Ditillo (2008) and Varoutsa and
Scapens (2015) both find that different forms of governance
are needed at eachmaturity phase. Consequently, supply chain
reconstruction is likely to be accompanied by governance
changes (Varoutsa and Scapens 2015). Each stage of maturity
is equal to a specific level of organizational capability, such as
the capability to interact and collaborate with the supplier or
customer effectively, and the capability position is itself a
combination of technical and organizational capabilities.
2.5 Summing up the conceptual framework
Based on the previous discussion, we present a theoretical
framework incorporating governance typology for global val-
ue chains by Gereffi et al. (2005), supply chain process man-
agement maturity (organizational capability) by Lockamy and
McCormack (2004) and Oliveira et al. (2011), and the sup-
pliers’ performance, technical capability (Fig. 1). In this study
we test the framework on the Swedish process industry.
Quadrant 1 (Q1) in Fig. 1 is the category of suppliers with
relatively low technical and organizational capabilities, sourced
by traditional arm’s-length contracts, often as sub-suppliers at
planned shut-downs. They possess neither the organizational
capability needed for relational forms of collaboration nor the
technical skill to do strategically important core-close mainte-
nance. In quadrant 2, highly mature suppliers can be expected.
The low technical capability could indicate entrance in a new
market; therefore, the potential to leverage the position into
quadrant 4 is very high. Until then, they are governed with
market contracts based on price, mostly for corrective mainte-
nance. In quadrant 3, modular contractors making services or
products such as spare parts to customer’s specifications could
be expected when the suppliers increase their maturity close to
the Vision level. In quadrant 4 are found the suppliers with
capability to manage deep collaboration and partnerships.
They also have the technical skills to perform core-close main-
tenance, both corrective and preventive, as well as to develop
more competitive maintenance processes.
3 Research methodology
We adopted a multiple case study methodology to address the
purpose of our research. Four global buying firms and four
service suppliers (of which one is global, three regional) par-
ticipated in the study. The characteristics of the firms are elab-
orated in the next section. Case study methodology was found
appropriate because there is a need to explore a new phenom-
enon and to build knowledge (Yin 2014). Qualitative case
studies have been identified as offering the most interesting
research opportunities (Bartunek et al. 2006). Both Weick
(1969) and Cronbach (1975) recommend that researchers
should Btry harder to make interpretations specific to
situations^. Learning from a particular case, conditioned by
the environmental context, should be considered a strength
rather than a weakness. The interaction between a phenome-
non and its context is best understood through in-depth case
studies (Dubois and Gadde 2002). Even though the number of
companies is rather small, this study meets the standard of
good credibility, according to the credibility scale for small
samples presented by Forza (2002).
The analysis was done in two steps. First, we used the
questionnaire from the SCMM model presented by
Fig. 1 Supplier capability framework
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Lockamy and McCormack (2004). The model weights nine
variables differently according to their appearance in different
constructs in a set of 94 questions, using a five-point Likert
scale. The maturity level was then defined by the total score
(490) set by the answers of the questionnaire. This maturity
model was selected because it had already been tested and
validated (Lockamy and McCormack 2004; McCormack
et al. 2008; Söderberg and Bengtsson 2010). As a comple-
ment, we used the SCPM3 model by Oliveira et al. (2011) to
define the levels of maturity, because it is the most updated
model and has a strong similarity to the former model. The
definition of the different levels is similar and the description
of mechanisms and characteristics of each level is somewhat
more clarified, although the scores that define each level are
slightly different.
The suppliers were each visited for an interview. However,
since the maturity models used retain a certain level of sub-
jectivity as they are based on managers’ perceptions (Souza
et al. 2015), we recommend that future researchers verify
whether data correspond to a firm’s actual practices
(McCormack et al. 2009; Souza et al. 2015). The plant man-
agement, who in the case of the three local suppliers are the
owners of the firms, have scant knowledge about SCM prac-
tices, so we went to visit them and discussed the question-
naires together, to give the respondents enough background
information about SCM to answer the questions properly. All
the respondents agreed with the necessity of this approach.
We used semi-structured interviews to identify what kind
of maintenance the four buying firms have outsourced, focus-
ing on maintenance within the production plant (Levery
1998), how they outsourced (both purchased and supplied)
the activities, and their future strategy for their maintenance
activities. The interviews, conducted with in total 13
maintenance- and purchasing managers in the four steel com-
panies, covered questions concerning strategies for mainte-
nance management and implementations such as supplier se-
lection process, supplier–buyer relationships, strategic contri-
bution of maintenance, internal maintenance organization
structure, capability position, attitudes towards outsourcing,
and future strategies. In addition, interviews were conducted
with supplier 1 on one more occasion to clarify how the local
firm fits in with the global parent company’s business model
and strategy. This question was asked of the three local sup-
pliers at the same time as the maturity analysis was done. The
suppliers’ technical skills were evaluated by the buying firms
as well as by the supplier themselves on a scale of low, skillful
and highly skillful.
The data analysis was based on written summaries about
each case company. After we identified characteristics of
maintenance, we initiated a cross-case analysis, looking for
similarities and divergences across the cases to find common
practices and strategies regarding outsourcing and capability
development. All answers as well as analysis done were
validated by the respondents at the studied firms (Voss
et al. 2002).
3.1 The case companies
The four buying firms (named buying firms 1–4) were chosen
because they all have complex manufacturing plants and ex-
tensive maintenance but have applied outsourcing to various
extents. The participating firms are steel companies producing
world-class products used in a variety of areas on the global
market (Table 1). These four big steel companies and their
supplier base are the foundation for one of Sweden’s biggest
industry clusters, and together they represent a majority of
Swedish steel industry as well as the foundation of it 150 years
ago. Taken together these firms cover a large proportion of the
Nordic steel industry.
The participating suppliers (Table 2) were chosen because
of their regional connection, and they all supply a variety of
industries. All four suppliers serve at least one of the four steel
companies participating in the study. These four suppliers
cover a majority of maintenance specialists in the region, serv-




As shown in Table 1, company sizes differ in both sales and
employees. About 10–20 % of the employees are contracted
by the maintenance division. The balance between handling
maintenance as outsourcing or in-house production is about
50–50 to 40–60, the percentage of outsourcing is a little bit
less than in more complex process industries in Sweden such
as mining, where the balance is 80–20 % (Maley et al. 2015).
Most of the externally services are performed by local or re-
gional suppliers. The trend is to decrease the supplier base for
maintenance services, contracting with more capable and ma-
ture suppliers as key suppliers. Taken together, our sample of
buying firms covers a large proportion of the Nordic steel
industry. A summary of the buying firms follows.
Buying firm 1 is a global and innovative engineering
group with a strong commitment to enhancing customer
productivity, profitability, and safety. The company’s op-
erations are concentrated in three core areas: tools and
tooling systems for metal cutting, equipment and tools
for mining, and products in advanced stainless steels,
special alloys, and titanium. Buying firm 1 has approxi-
mately 600 employees working with maintenance activ-
ities. The mechanical maintenance divisions are central-
ized for all plants. The companies’ needs for hydraulic
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Table 1 Case Specifics, Steel
Companies (based on annual
reports for 2013)
Buying firm 1 Buying firm 2 Buying firm 3 Buying firm 4
Founded/country 1862/Sweden 1916/Sweden 1910/Finland 1878/Sweden
Market Global Global Global Global
Sales (global) 9800 MEuro 850 MEuro 6745 MEuro 3800 MEuro
Employees
(global)





















































Table 2 Case Specifics,
Suppliers (based on annual
reports for 2014/15)
Supplier 1 Supplier 2 Supplier 3 Supplier 4
Founded/country 1853/France 1989/Sweden 1984/Sweden 2004/Sweden
Market Global International Sweden Sweden
Sales (global) 24,965 MEuro 4.1 MEuro 9.5 MEuro 3.5 MEuro
Employees
(global)
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and automation services are performed with internal
(hierarchical) contracts except for new installations,
which are performed externally. All other maintenance
services are decentralized, with the responsibility and
management inside each plant. The company is using
all suppliers except supplier 1, mainly with market con-
tracts (Table 3). They have a few modular contracts with
supplier 2 as a complement to their market contracts for
corrective maintenance, negotiating for a relational con-
tract involving improvement efforts from the supplier.
Supplier 3 is only used for market contracts with some
exceptions for spare parts, where they have a modular
contract. They later ended their contract with supplier 4
due to the supplier’s inability to develop and sustain its
organizational capability. Supplier 4 is now governed by
strict captive governance as a subcontractor to a newly
contracted international supplier. The company believes
there will be many more collaborative and relational con-
tracts in the future as digitization drives analysis and pre-
dictability forward, simultaneously increasing the de-
mands for high relative capability positions by the sup-
pliers. The company has some of their core-distant main-
tenance, such as trucks and overhead cranes, outsourced
to highly skillful and mature suppliers competing on an
international market.
Buying firm 2 is a leading European producer of engi-
neering steel for customers in the bearing, transport, and
manufacturing industries. Production comprises primari-
ly bar, tube, ring, and pre-components in low-alloy steels
that are often used for demanding applications such as in
bearings, powertrains, hydraulic cylinders, and rock
drills. The company has a decentralized maintenance or-
ganization except for automation and hydraulics, which is
performed with internal contracts (hierarchical).
Approximately 200 people serve the company with main-
tenance services. Buying firm 2 only uses suppliers 2 and
3, mainly with market contracts for corrective mainte-
nance. Supplier 2 has had a few modular contracts in
recent years. Like supplier 1, they have outsourced
core-distant maintenance, such as trucks and overhead
cranes, to highly skillful and mature suppliers competing
on an international market. Buying firm 2 has the same
view as buying firm 1 on the future development of the
core-close maintenance services, supported by the possi-
bilities given by future digitization efforts by the industry.
Buying firm 3 is a global leader in stainless steel; they
create advanced materials that are efficient, long lasting,
and recyclable. The company has a rich tradition in
metals, and the company has been instrumental in devel-
oping the stainless-steel industry into what it is today. The
company’s mechanical maintenance is outsourced to the
highly skillful and highly mature supplier 1 with partner
arrangements and relational governance (Table 3). The
contract with supplier 1 has evolved over time as the
supplier leveraged their technical skills. The firm has
outsourced electrical maintenance, vibration analysis,
and services of vital control systems where the company
doesn’t have the right competences to more skillful sup-
pliers with a high maturity. The maintenance service is
governed with contracts ranging from modular to rela-
tional, based on social and technical structures rather than
economic, depending on the specifications of the services
and the capability position of the supplier. The rest of
their maintenance is decentralized, but the company has
started a change towards a centralized organization and a
decrease in employees from approximately 265 to 165.
The firm uses all suppliers except supplier 4 for their
outsourced maintenance services. Supplier 2 has both
market and modular contracts and supplier 3 holds main-
ly market contracts for corrective maintenance. They use
supplier 3 temporarily for modular contracts of recurrent
services and spare parts as needed. They have outsourced
core-distant maintenance, such as trucks and overhead
cranes, to highly skillful and mature suppliers competing
on an international market. They shared the same view as
buying firms 1 and 2 on future development of the core-
Table 3 Suppliers and capability
positions Technical
Capability*






Supplier 1 Highly skillful Dynamic 346 Relational/modular**
Supplier 2 Highly skillful Vision 269 Modular/market***
Supplier 3 Skillful Structure 240 Market***/(modular)
Supplier 4 Skillful Structure 227 Market/captive
Buyer firm
1****
Highly skillful Integration 304 Hierarchical
* Estimated by all participating case companies
**When customer did not have the capability to meet up with the requirements for relational governance
*** For corrective maintenance
**** Representative for maintenance organizations within the steel industry
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close maintenance services towards relational contracts
and partnerships, inspired by the opportunities offered
by future digitization efforts by the industry.
Buying firm 4 is a Nordic and US-based steel company
with a global reach and cost-efficient and flexible produc-
tion system. The company is a leading producer on the
global market for advanced high-strength steels and
quenched and tempered steels; standard strip, plate, and
tubular products; as well as construction solutions. The
company has a centralized maintenance organization and
approximately 300 employees within the maintenance
organization. They perform services for most of the
core-close maintenance such as mechanical, automation,
and control systems with internal contracts (hierarchical)
or with service agreements from the suppliers of the
equipment. External suppliers are mostly used for correc-
tive and time-critical maintenance they don’t have their
own resources for. The firm uses supplier 2 for corrective
maintenance with market contracts and for more speci-
fied maintenance with modular contracts. Suppliers 3 and
4 are contracted mostly for corrective maintenance with
market contracts. Core-distant maintenance such as
trucks and overhead cranes are outsourced to highly skill-
ful and mature suppliers competing on an international
market. Like the others, they have the same view on
the future development of the core-close mainte-
nance services.
4.2 Supplier firms
Supplier 1 is an established European supplier located all
over the world and one of the largest maintenance sup-
pliers in the Nordic countries, active in most areas of
maintenance such as facilities, energy, automotive,
manufacturing, and complex process industries. It was
established in the region when acquiring a local mainte-
nance firm that mainly serves buying firm 3. The firm’s
capability position, both technical and organizational ca-
pability, is very high (Table 3). The firm mostly uses
relational contracts and partnership arrangements involv-
ing process development and continuous improvements
(CI) for most of their customers. They have more devel-
oped partnerships with customers from other industry
sectors such as the energy and chemical industries, be-
cause they find a higher degree of organizational capabil-
ity within firms from these industry sectors. After acquir-
ing the local maintenance firm, the supplier tried to im-
plement a partnership based on relational governance but
failed due to lack of technical skills and process knowl-
edge of the customers’ production process. After a while,
the supplier had increased their skills and process knowl-
edge and could proceed to implement the original
business strategy together with the customer. The suppli-
er states that a turning point for success for modular and
relation contracts, especially for partnering arrangements,
is that both the customer and supplier have the same
foundation of capability position, especially the organiza-
tional capability (eg, process maturity).
Supplier 2 is a well-established, highly skillful, and ma-
ture supplier (Table 3) of maintenance services, special-
ized in serving buying firm 1 with both corrective and
preventive maintenance. The supplier also produces both
services and spare parts on customer specifications to all
four of the buying firms. Supplier 2 does continuous pro-
cess improvements on a regular basis. The supplier serves
international customers with customer-specific products
for the energy sector. Supplier 2 is a highly skillful and
specialized supplier with good process knowledge of
steel plants, in particular the processes of buying firm 1.
Supplier 3 is a skillful and low-maturity supplier
(Table 3) with a high capacity for rapid and flexible cor-
rective maintenance. Supplier 3 serves all four of the
buying firms with market arrangements, mainly for cor-
rective maintenance. Supplier 3 also makes spare parts on
customer specifications.
Supplier 4 is a skillful and low-maturity supplier with the
capacity for corrective maintenance (Table 3). They sup-
ply the steel and process industries, as well as the energy
and nuclear industries with corrective maintenance based
onmarket contracts. Supplier 4 lost their market contracts
and is now acting as a sub-supplier.
Buyer firm 1 has a highly skillful and high-maturity in-
ternal maintenance organization (Table 3), serving the
plant with both corrective and preventive maintenance
through hierarchical (internal) contracts, approximately
50–60 % of all performed maintenance. The maturity
level is higher than the maturity within the regional sup-
pliers, but not as high as the international supplier 1.
5 Analysis and discussion
Next we will discuss how our empirical findings inform the
two research questions of our study. The following analysis
and discussion will also provide a basis for validating the
proposed conceptual framework presented earlier (Fig. 1).
5.1 Analysis
Our first research question (RQ1) was how the distinction
between core-close or core-distant maintenance affects the
outsourcing decision. All the buying firms share a consensus
about maintenance structure, meaning that maintenance pro-
cesses inside the production plant must be divided into core-
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close maintenance or core-distant maintenance due to the im-
pact on production efficiency (high or low strategic impact on
overall business performance), and therefore must be man-
aged differently. Processes that directly affect the production
line and machinery are considered core-close maintenance, all
other processes as core-distant.
The findings show that there is indeed a distinction be-
tween different maintenance processes inside the plant, that
between core-close and core-distant maintenance. This dis-
tinction is of importance for the strategic aspect of the
outsourcing decision, when it defines the level of strategic
impact of the process, high or low (McIvor 2008). However,
this distinction builds upon the process contribution to pro-
duction efficiency (a distinction not fixed over time) and is not
directly connected to the business strategy. That might be one
reason, of many others, why corporate management have
neglected the strategic importance of maintenance processes.
This phenomenon has been identified in the literature (eg,
Gupta et al. 2009; Murthy et al. 2002; Pintelon et al. 2006).
The results from the study show that maintenance processes
are difficult to classify as being of either high or low compet-
itive nature (Cox 1996), and therefore hard to determine
whether or how to outsource.
The second research question (RQ2) concerned how capa-
bility position affects the governance of the outsourced main-
tenance activities. The findings show that the governance
strategy chosen by the case companies is strongly influenced
by the suppliers’ relative capability position. This position
depends on a combination of technical capability (eg, skilled
individuals, process knowledge, advanced technology, inno-
vative and entrepreneurial approach), and organizational ca-
pability (eg, process maturity). The combination sets the pre-
requisites for the possibilities of different governance options,
as displayed in Table 3.
All steel companies in the study combine mainly market
governance with arm’s-length contracts based on price for
their corrective maintenance using external contracts. As a
complement, they all use modular governance with turn-key
suppliers based on contracts, emphasizing preventability, ca-
pability, flexibility, reliability, and responsiveness, sometimes
with a fixed price whenmature suppliers are available. Buying
firm 3 differs from the others in that they are using relational
governance and partnering arrangements with supplier 1 for
their core-close maintenance. Buying firm 1 used to govern
supplier 4 with a market contract; later, this was changed to a
captive governance contract with supplier 4 as a sub-supplier
due to the supplier’s relatively low capability position and
failure to increase the position (Table 4).
The findings indicate that a high level of only one technical
or organizational capability is not enough to build a founda-
tion for modular or relational governance for complex and
strategically important maintenance processes. There is a need
for high organizational capability (eg, process maturity) and
technical capability to handle complex buyer–supplier rela-
tionships (Lockamy and McCormack 2004 and Oliveira
et al. 2011). This need is confirmed by the transition from
market contract to relation-based contract displayed by sup-
plier 1 as their technical capability evolved over time.
Furthermore, the study shows that suppliers with strength in
only one of these capabilities will most certainly be procured
with traditional market contracts. Maturity at least close to the
Vision level is needed for modular contracts involving
customer-specific information; to the Integration level for re-
lational contracts where cooperation, collaborative behavior,
and logistic integration take place. Finally, a maturity at
Dynamic level for full partnering arrangements with system-
atic and integrated horizontal inter-organizational processes,
CI efforts, and responsiveness to changing demands is needed
(Oliveira et al. 2011; Varoutsa and Scapens 2015; Gereffi et al.
2005). However, notice that it is the lowest capability level of
the buyer or the supplier that decides the appropriate gover-
nance alternative.
5.2 Discussion
Our findings show that the sourcing framework suggested by
McIvor (2008) is valuable for identifying the capability posi-
tions of competitors and suppliers, as well as the strategic
importance of the outsourced process. However, using the
framework alone does not capture the full complexity of the
outsourcing decisions made within the case companies.
McIvor (2008) does present governance alternatives; he sug-
gests adopting appropriate contractual arrangements to deal
with potential opportunism. But his framework does not pro-
vide any guidance on how to select governance alternatives
based on the supplier firms’ ability to manage highly specific
and complex transactions such as partnering arrangements.
The governance typology for global value chains by Gereffi
et al. (2005) presents a slightly different picture of outsourcing
alternatives. They explain the governance options based on
Table 4 Summary of governance
and suppliers used for outsourced
maintenance
Governance type Buying firm 1 Buying firm 2 Buying firm 3 Buying firm 4
Supplier 1 – – Relational –
Supplier 2 Modular/market Modular Modular Modular
Supplier 3 Market/(modular) Market Market Market/(modular)
Supplier 4 Market/captive – – Market
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the complexity of the transaction rather than the risk of oppor-
tunism. Even if the governance typology presented by Gereffi
et al. (2005) is not introduced as a decision framework, it
illustrates well how the governance mechanisms and needs
increase as the customer-supplier relationship becomes more
complex. Our study confirms that and highlights the need for
governance allowing complex interfirm coordination, espe-
cially for complex core-close maintenance within partnership
arrangements. However, like the framework from McIvor
(2008), it doesn’t take the suppliers’ ability to conduct the
relationship into account. Thus, there is a need for a third
perspective on the outsourcing issue.
In relationship to the Supply Chain Process Management
Maturity model by Lockamy and McCormack (2004) and
Oliveira et al. (2011), a third perspective emerges: organiza-
tional capability. This kind of capability defines the supplier’s
ability to collaborate and interact with the outsourcing firm
and manage those complex transaction characteristics identi-
fied by Gereffi et al. (2005). Our study confirms the conclu-
sions reached by Varoutsa and Scapens (2015) that gover-
nance structure evolves a more trustworthy and technical
structure as the supply chain matures and transaction com-
plexity increases (Gereffi et al. 2005). We agree with
Lockamy and McCormack (2004) and Oliveira et al. (2011)
when they discuss the necessity to reach a high maturity level
to be able to manage deep intra-organizational collaboration
and interactions with partners. This is especially interesting
when combined with the frameworks of Gereffi et al.
(2005), McIvor (2008), and the results from Varoutsa and
Scapens (2015).
Summarizing, our study suggests that outsourcing deci-
sions are far more complex and difficult than shown in
existing frameworks. McIvor (2008) highlights the capability
position but excludes organizational capability. Gereffi et al.
(2005) stress the transaction complexity and the ability to
manage information sharing and collaboration, but do not
directly address organizational capability or process
maturity. Varoutsa and Scapens link the level of supply
chain maturity to governance evolvement, addressing the
supply chain in a broader sense. The SCMM model by
Lockamy and McCormack (2004) is also relevant, since it
captures the temporal evolution of the outsourcing relation-
ships as described in the case companies. Together these
frameworks build a foundation for outsourcing decisions.
6 Conclusions
Our findings highlight the importance of identifying the
outsourced maintenance process contribution to production
efficiency, and thereby categorizing the maintenance as core-
close or core-distant. The results from the study show that
the capability position of the supplier, specifically the
mix of technical and organizational capability, affects
and influences the choice of governance option with
maintenance outsourcing, as well as the relationship
with the supplier.
Our study makes at least two theoretical contributions.
Firstly, the study contributes to outsourcing literature
confirming the outsourcing strategy framework by McIvor
(2008) as a useful tool even for analyzing support processes
such as maintenance. Secondly, the study contributes to SCM
literature by emphasizing that when a supply chain matures,
the supply chain reconstructs and SCM relies more on collab-
oration and trust than formal contracts and control mecha-
nisms (Ballou et al. 2000 and Varoutsa and Scapens 2015).
Maintenance is no exception. We furthermore confirmed the
claims by Gereffi et al. (2005) and Varoutsa and Scapens
(2015) that governance changes as the value chain matures
or evolves to be more complex. We have extended the
validity of these frameworks by testing them in a new
and specific context.
Looking at implications, we believe the findings can help
managers to better understand the important of the mainte-
nance distinctions (core-close or core-distant) for the
outsourcing decision, as it affects the production efficiency
and thereby the firm’s overall business strategy. It could also
help managers to be familiar with the characteristics of their
firm’s capability position and leverage the understanding of
how capability position influences the governance decision.
Furthermore, the framework presented here could provide
guidelines for choosing the right supplier (Ireland et al. 2002
and Dekker 2004) by showing what capability position the
supplier needs for each different level of transaction complex-
ity expressed by the governance typology defined by Gereffi
et al. (2005), and thereby designing appropriate governance
mechanisms (Williamson 1999; Gereffi et al. 2005; Meer-
Kooistra and Scapens 2008; McIvor 2008). We support
Varoutsa and Scapens (2015) in their opinion that a firm is
unlikely to be able to move from arm’s-length relationships to
collaborative relationships in a single step. Governance mech-
anisms must evolve; they cannot be designed and put in place.
Furthermore, personal and technical skills are also needed for
a deeper relationship, and they must evolve too.
7 Limitations and further research
There are several limitations of our study. One limitation is the
process-industry focus, which might limit the generalizability
of the findings even though outsourcing and governance is-
sues are relevant in other industries. Further research is re-
quired to obtain an in-depth understanding of the outsourcing
decision-making process in relation to maintenance and gov-
ernance. A key issue here is to understand the distinction
between core-close and core-distant maintenance, as well as
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how the capability position affects the design of governance
mechanisms and structures. It would thus be useful to explore
in depth governance structures in existing partnerships be-
tween buyer and suppliers in a variety of industries.
The new era of digitization and the Internet of Things (IoT)
increases the strategic importance of those decisions.
Managers have new opportunities to diagnose, predict, solve,
and maintain production. Thus, the knowledge required to
manage maintenance activities has become more challenging,
resulting in pressure on manufacturers to outsource mainte-
nance to specialized suppliers. Therefore, it would be valuable
to do research on the impact of IoT on the outsourcing of
maintenance requirements.
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